Guide · How it works
What someone sees if they copy your vault app’s files
If the vault encrypts properly, a copy of its files shows random-looking data with meaningless names: no pictures, no captions, no album names. What a copy can still give away is the outline: roughly how many files there are, how big they are and when they changed. A badly built vault can give away more, such as plain thumbnails or a readable list of names. And none of this matters if the person can simply unlock the app on your phone.
On this page
Three ways a copy gets made
A vault’s files can be copied from three places, and each copy holds something different.
| Where the copy comes from | What it holds |
|---|---|
| The phone itself | The app’s files, protected by the phone’s own encryption on top |
| A backup of the phone | Whatever the app allows into backups |
| The vault’s cloud backup | What the app uploads, in the form it uploads it |
Even before any app adds its own lock, the iPhone encrypts what it stores. Apple says all data on an iPhone is stored in encrypted form, and that setting a passcode turns on Data Protection. The question here is what is left once that outer layer is gone, for example in a backup or a cloud copy.
What a well-built vault leaves in a copy
Photos and videos. Each file is ciphertext: bytes that look like noise and can’t be opened without the key. There is no image header, no preview, nothing a photo viewer can show. In Sealed: Sealed encrypts every file with AES-256-GCM before it is saved. Each file gets its own random 256-bit key, and that key is sealed with your vault key.
Thumbnails. This is the gap people forget. A vault that keeps a plain thumbnail cache gives away a small picture of every photo. Thumbnails are encrypted like the photos, and Sealed wipes the decrypted copies it shows in the grid when the vault locks.
Names and notes. Album names, captions and typed notes can say as much as a photo. They should be encrypted too, not kept in a readable database. Names, notes and the fields of a record are sealed with your vault key too, not just the photos.
File names. On disk the files should have random names, not “beach-2026.jpg”.
Changed files. If someone alters an encrypted file, the vault should notice rather than show a damaged picture. Large files are encrypted in chunks, and Sealed refuses a file that has been changed, reordered or cut short.
What a copy still gives away
Encryption covers content, not existence. Anyone with a copy can usually still see:
- that the vault exists and roughly how many files it holds,
- how big each file is, so a long video stands out from a photo,
- when files were added or changed.
A cloud backup shows a similar outline. Backup records have plain types such as VaultItem and SecureNote and random identifiers, so iCloud can see that a backup exists and roughly how many records it holds.
That outline is rarely a problem on its own, but it is not nothing. A thousand files with fresh dates tell a story even when none of them opens.
Where the key lives decides everything
Encrypted files are only as safe as the key that opens them. Three questions:
- Is the key made from your passcode? If so, a short passcode can be guessed offline, against the copy, at full speed. A random key avoids that. Your vault key is a random 256-bit key. It is not made from your passcode.
- Does the key travel with the copy? If the key is in the same backup as the files, the copy is a box with its key taped on. Your vault key is kept in the iPhone Keychain, on this device only, and it can be read only while the phone is unlocked.
- Who else holds the key? If the developer keeps a copy for password resets, the files are only as private as their servers. Zero-knowledge encryption, explained covers that idea.
When a copy matters, and when it doesn’t
A copy taken with the phone locked is the hard case for an attacker. A copy is beside the point if someone can unlock the phone and the app in front of them. That is why the lock on the app, and what a face scan can open, matter as much as the encryption. How photo vault apps work puts those layers together, and what is in an iPhone backup covers the phone side.
Where Sealed helps, and where it doesn’t
It helps because every file, thumbnail and name in a copy is ciphertext. Each file gets its own random 256-bit key, and that key is sealed with your vault key. Thumbnails are encrypted like the photos, and Sealed wipes the decrypted copies it shows in the grid when the vault locks. Names, notes and the fields of a record are sealed with your vault key too, not just the photos.
It helps keep the key out of the copy. Your vault key is kept in the iPhone Keychain, on this device only, and it can be read only while the phone is unlocked. Sealed keeps its encrypted files out of your iPhone’s own backups, because the key never leaves this iPhone and a copy in a phone backup would not open on a new phone.
It helps you check the format yourself: it is published in Sealed’s encryption specification. The reader is open source and travels inside every open copy, as a Python script and an offline web page.
It doesn’t come with an outside review yet. Sealed has not had an independent security audit.
It doesn’t mask how many records a backup holds or how big they are. In your iCloud backup, Apple can see each record’s type, a random record name, when the record was created and changed, the size of its files and how many records there are, but not what is in them.
It doesn’t keep the key from the app while the phone is unlocked, unless you turn on Maximum Security. Without Maximum Security, the app can read your vault key whenever the phone is unlocked, because the key sits in the Keychain.
Questions and answers
Can someone open a copied vault with a password-guessing program?
Only if the files are protected by something guessable. In Sealed the vault key is random and is not made from your passcode. Your vault key is a random 256-bit key. It is not made from your passcode. Your passcode is a gate in front of the app. It is not part of the key.
Do Sealed’s files go into my iPhone’s own backup?
No. Sealed keeps its encrypted files out of your iPhone’s own backups, because the key never leaves this iPhone and a copy in a phone backup would not open on a new phone.
What can Apple see of my Sealed backup in iCloud?
In your iCloud backup, Apple can see each record’s type, a random record name, when the record was created and changed, the size of its files and how many records there are, but not what is in them.
Sources
What this page says about Sealed was checked against the app on .
- Sealed on the App Store — the listing for the app used as the example
Get Sealed
Sealed is free to download, and Sealed Pro is an optional in-app purchase.