Guide · Vault recovery

Shamir secret sharing explained: split a key so no one holds it

Shamir’s scheme splits a key into several parts so that any chosen number of them rebuild it, while fewer parts reveal nothing at all about it. It works by placing the key on a curve: a few points pin the curve down, one point too few fits every possible key. It is a way to keep a recovery key with people you trust without trusting any one of them alone.

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The problem it solves

A recovery key is a single point of failure in two directions. Keep it in one place, and one fire or one lost drawer ends it. Give copies to three friends, and any one of them can open what it guards, or lose their copy to a thief.

Shamir’s scheme removes both risks at once. You make several parts. Enough of them rebuild the key. Fewer than that are worth nothing, not even a hint. It was first published by Adi Shamir in a short journal paper, and it is still the standard way to do this.

The idea in one picture

Picture a straight line on a graph. Two points fix it: there is only one line through both. One point does not: endless lines pass through it, pointing every way.

Now place the key at the spot where the line crosses the side of the graph. Hand one point on the line to each person.

  • Any two people put their points together, draw the one line through them, and read the key off the side.
  • One person alone has a point that a line through every possible key also passes. Their point says nothing about which one.

That is a “2 of n” split: as many points as you like, any two rebuild it. For “3 of n”, use a curve that needs three points to pin down, and so on. The rule, as the article on the scheme puts it, is that k points fix a curve of degree k minus one, and any fewer leave the key completely undetermined.

Why “nothing” really means nothing

Most security rests on a guess being too slow. Shamir’s scheme is different. A part held alone is consistent with every possible key, equally. No computer, however fast, can pull a key from it, because the answer isn’t in there. The article calls this information-theoretic security.

Two honest limits remain:

  1. Enough parts in the wrong hands rebuild the key. The scheme counts parts, not people’s intentions.
  2. A part usually shows that it is a part. It may say which set it belongs to and how many are needed, so people know what to do with it. That label is not the key.

Choosing the numbers

Split Lose up to People who must meet Fits when
Two of three one part two a small circle, simple to use
Three of five two parts three a wider circle, more margin

The figures follow from the rule in the scheme’s write-up: with k needed out of n, you can lose n minus k parts and still rebuild.

A higher number needed is safer against people meeting behind your back and harder for you on the bad day. Most people do well with the smaller split.

Picking the people

  • People who will still be reachable in five or ten years.
  • People in different places, so one event doesn’t take several parts.
  • People who don’t know each other, so they can’t team up easily.
  • Tell each person what the part is for, and that one part alone is useless to them.

Where Sealed helps, and where it doesn’t

It helps with key guardians, built on this scheme. Key guardians split the key with Shamir’s scheme, so a group of parts smaller than the number needed fits every possible key equally well. Key guardians split your recovery key into 3 parts where any 2 bring it back, or into 5 parts where any 3 do, one part for each person you trust. The key guardians page shows the screens.

It helps because no copy stays behind. Sealed doesn’t keep the guardian parts: once you close the screen, they exist only where you sent them. The recovery key and key guardians are free for everyone.

It doesn’t replace your own copy of the key. Sealed tells you to keep your own recovery key too, because guardians are a way back and not a replacement. The recovery key guide covers where to keep it.

It doesn’t keep parts quiet about being parts. A guardian part does not keep quiet that it is a part: its set, its number and how many parts are needed can be read from it, though the key cannot.

Questions and answers

Is splitting a key into halves the same thing?

No. If you cut a key in two, each half gives away half the key, and the missing half is far easier to guess. A Shamir part gives away nothing until enough parts meet.

Can the people holding parts get together without me?

Yes, if enough of them meet. That is why it helps to pick people who don’t know each other. Sealed suggests choosing guardians who don’t know each other, so it is hard for them to get together without you.

Do the parts expire?

The math doesn’t expire, but the key behind it can change. In Sealed: Making a new recovery key retires every guardian part of the old key, and sealed copies of the old key stop working once the new key is saved and your next backup finishes.

Sources

What this page says about Sealed was checked against the app on .

  • Wikipedia, article on Shamir’s scheme — first published by Adi Shamir in 1979 in Communications of the ACM; k points fix a polynomial of degree k-1; k-1 or fewer shares leave the shared value completely undetermined. Read 13 Nov 2026
  • Sealed on the App Store — the listing for the app used as the example

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